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RESOURCE FLOWS TO THE CARIBBEAN IN THE 1980s
Introduction
1. The economies of both developing and developed countries grew 
at an impressive rate throughout the period of the 1950s and 1970s. 
Per capita incomes increased in developing countries by almost 3 
per cent a year throughout the period, with annual growth rates 
accelerating from about 2 per cent in the 1950s to 3.4 per cent in 
the 1960s1. The developed economies grew even more rapidly, 
maintaining an annual growth raté of 5 per cent in the 1960s and 
early 1970sz. At that time, the bulk of world savings were 
concentrated in the high-income developed countries and resource 
flows with various degrees of concessionality were channelled to 
developing countries through bilateral and multilateral agencies. 
International commercial bank lending to developing countries was 
beginning to assume an increasing importance in the overall volume 
of resource flows.
2. Then came the first oil-price increase of 1973 which resulted 
in a huge transfer of financial resources from oil-importing 
developed countries to oil-exporting countries. Since these 
resources largely exceeded those countries' investment and 
consumption needs, they found their way into the banks of developed 
countries of Western Europe and North America. It was during this 
period that international commercial bank lending to developing 
countries on market terms grew very quickly and, as both borrowers 
and lenders would learn later through the debt crisis, was not 
always done with the caution customarily associated with 
international lending operations.
3. The banks and official creditors did not seem to have assessed 
properly the risks involved in lending to developing countries and 
a large number of the latter did not always put the borrowed funds 
to the best possible use. Some capital-importing developing 
countries seemed to have used ¡most of their inflows of foreign 
savings to offset substantially lower savings rates rather than to 
increase their investment rates (see Table I) . Maintenance and 
increase of consumption levels seemed to have assumed greater 
priority than increasing productive investments in those countries.
i
4. The international economic and financial environment 
prevailing at that time was characterized by relatively easy access 
to financial resources and allowed some oil-importing developing 
countries, especially middle-income ones, to incur increasingly
‘The World Bank, World Development Report 1978. Chapter II, 
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Differences in savings and investment behaviour 
before the debt crisis among capital-importing 
developing countries in % of GDP
1971-75 1978-82 Change
All countries .Savings rate 18 15 -3
Investment rate 22.5 25.5 3
Current balance -4.5 -10.5 -6
Countries with Savings rate 19 13.5 -5.5
debt-servicing Investment rate 22 23 1
problems Curreht balance -3 -9.5 -6.5
Countries without Savings rate 16 16.5 0.5
debt-servicing Investment rate 22.5 26.5 4
problems Current balance -6.5 -10 -3.5
Source: Jacques Polak, Financial Policies and Development.
OECD, Paris, 1989
large balance-of-payments deficits. The financing of these 
deficits was almost always easily achieved on reasonable terms, 
including negative real interest rates from abroad, and it was 
widely believed then that such a favourable financing environment 
would continue for some time in the future. This situation brought 
about a certain neglect of the mobilization of local resources for 
investment as well as postponement of economic adjustments. 
Indeed, in the 1970s, most oil-importing developing countries 
increased their investment ratio to GDP through borrowing while 
lowering or keeping at the same level their savings ratios.
5. In the late 1970s, the industrialized countries were faced 
with an upsurge of inflationary pressures brought about by the big 
increase in the price of oil-, among other factors. The economic 
policies adopted by these countries to combat inflation took their 
economies into recession and reduced their demand for developing 
countries' exports. The immediate effect of the recession in the 
developed countries was a sharp decrease in official resource flows 
to developing countries.
6. While the world was slowly recovering fr*om the recession of 
the second half of the 1970s, the second increase in the price of 
oil took place in 1979/80 and helped push the world into an 
economic crisis characterized by severe debt-servicing problems of 
developing countries and a further reduction in the flow of
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resources to these countries. The loans contracted in the mid- 
» 1970s at reasonable interest rates and in a favourable world
economic environment fell due at a time when the economic 
environment was becoming unfavourable.
7. In order to counter ever-rising inflation rates in their 
economies and the effects of the second oil-price rise, the 
industrialized countries implemented tight monetary and fiscal 
policies. This resulted in an increase in interest rates and a 
greater volatility of the exchange rates of the major currencies 
of the world which had been allowed to float after the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system of fix^d exchange rates in the early 
1970s.
8. Implementaticn of these policies resulted- in a substantial 
increase in the servicing of developing countries' debt contracted 
on commercial terms and introduced a greater measure of uncertainty 
into external debt management due to exchange rate fluctuations. 
The value of the United States dollar, still by far the major 
reserve currency in the world, rose sharply compared to the other 
major world currencies because of the vigorous anti-inflationary 
policies pursued by the United States Government.
9. This rise has helped to decrease the competitiveness of United 
States goods and services in the world markets and resulted in a 
rising balance-of-payments deficit. However, the high United 
States dollar interest rates resulting from tight United States 
monetary policy have attracted an ever-increasing volume of 
investments in dollar-dominated assets in the United States, 
allowing the already widening balance-of-payments deficit to widen 
even further, compounded by an increasingly large fiscal deficit.
10. Other major trading nations such as the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Japan and the newly industrialized countries have managed 
to accumulate increasingly large balance-of-payments surpluses. 
These fiscal and trade imbalances persist at the end of the 1980s, 
despite efforts by the countries concerned to remedy the situation. 
The financing requirements of thf deficit industrialized countries 
continue to exert a strong pressure on world financial resources, 
to absorb a large part of the supply of such resources and to 
contribute greatly tn exchange-rate and interest-rate movements.
11. In the 1980s the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) assumed an increasingly important role in the supply of 
credit to a large number of * developing countries because of the 
debt crisis and the consequent loss of credit-worthiness by many 
developing countries. As a result of their roles as providers of 
and catalysts for external resources, both international 
organizations became increasingly involved in the formulation and 
supervision of the implementation of the economic policies of their 
developing member countries. The volume and terms of financial
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resources to developing countries especially those with debt- 
servicing problems, became more and more dependent on the support 
given by the Bank and the IMF to the economic policies implemented 
in the countries.
12. This paper will first look at the volume and terms of overall 
resource flows and then analyse the structure and pattern of flows 
going specifically to CDCC member countries. It will then review 
some of the literature on the contribution of external finance to 
economic growth, draw conclusions and make some recommendations.
The«overa11 picture
13. The need for external resources arises from the existence of 
current account deficits of the balance of payments or an excess 
of investment over savings in the economy. Countries seek to 
correct these imbalances through the mobilization of external 
resources. The greater the gap between savings and investment in 
the economy or the wider the balance-of-payments deficit, the more 
external resources will be required.
14. It was once the norm to consider resource flows from high- 
income developed countries to lower-income developing countries as 
a matter of course. The high income countries were thought to be 
capable of producing regular current account surpluses and a 
surplus of savings over investments that allowed a steady flow of 
resources to developing countries in the form of aid, loans and 
private investments. This situation, which used to be taken for 
granted, changed fundamentally with the two oil-price hikes and 
the advent of the debt crisis which, among other factors, helped 
to slow down or decrease the volume of resource flows to developing 
countries. Table II gives some indication of the changes taking 
place in the structure and pattern of resource flows over the 
period 1980-1988.
15. Net resource flows3 to developing countries as a whole declined 
in real terms from US$133.7 billion in 1981 to US$39.1 billion in 
1987, a decrease of 71 per cent. This was especially disruptive 
because during the same period, large debt-service payments by some 
developing countries fell flue; this and a deterioration in the 
terms of trade brought about a substantial reduction of resources 
available for economic growth and development purposes. The 
dramatic nature of the situation for these developing countries 
becomes even clearer when interest payments on medium and long-term 
loans and dividends on foreign direct investments are deducted from 
the aggregate net flows to obtain the aggregate net transfers.
3 Resource flows include loans and grants from official and 
private sources as well as private and official investments.
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Table II
Aggregate net resource flous to all developing countries 
1980-88 (in US$ millions )
Type of flow 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Official development finance «2.5 49.3 50.7 54.0 49.8 42.6 34.8 26.9 25.3
Official development assistance 26.2 27.5 26.5 24.4 28.2 31.3 27.2 26.3 25.4
Official grants a/ 14.9 14.1 . 13.5 13.5 16.4 19.8 17.3 14.9 14.7
Official concessional loans 11.3 13.41*i 13.0 10.9 11.8 11.5 9.9 11.4 10.7
Official nonconcessional loans 16.3 21.8 24.2 29.6 21.6 11.3 7.6 0.6 -0.1
Private flows 60.6 84.4 68.0 46.8 38.6 26.8 18.8 12.2 15.8
Private loans 48.6 64.5 53.2 35.2 25.5 18.7 8.9 0.1 3.9
Direct private investment b/ 9.4 17.5 12.0 8.8 9.9 4.5 6.6 9.0 9.0
Private grants c/ 2.6 2.4 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9
Aggregate net flows 103.1 133.7 118.7 100.8 88.4 69.4 53.6 39.1 41.1
Aggregate net transfers 65.7 84.5 58.9 41.6 19.4 -0.7 -1.9 -9.9 -9.8
a/ Excludes technical co-operation grants
b/ Excludes offshore banking
c/ Staff estimates based on OECD aggregate data
Source: DRS (for official"and private loans) and the OECD 1988 data bank for all other items. 
Data on flows and transfers on loans are on a payment basis and exclude short-term 
private lending.
This deduction results in a decrease, in real terms, from US$84.5 
billion in 1981 to US$-9.9 billion in 1987, or a net outflow of 
resources from developing countries to developed countries of 
almost US$10 billion in 1987. In 1988, there was a slight increase 
in net aggregate flows and a slight decrease in aggregate net 
transfers, but the level of these flows was still much lower than 
those of the early 1980s. If the reverse flows of capital flight 
were added, the magnitude of net aggregate transfers would be much 
greater.
16. The aggregate net transfers could be the result of either high 
debt-servicing and dividend payments combined with low inflow of 
capital, economic instability and loss of credit-worthiness 
associated with the heavily indebted developing countries of Latin 
America and Africa, or that of the increase of claims on foreign 
assets arising from balance-of-payments surpluses associated with 
the newly industrialized developing countries of Eastern Asia. It 
is clear, however, that the majority of developing countries fall 
into the first category rather than the second and are seriously 
affected by the decline in resource flows to their economies.
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17. Official development finance, which comprises official grants 
and official concessional and non-concessional loans, outstripped, 
in real terms, private flows from 1983 onwards although they have 
both decreased over the period 1980-1988. In 1981 private flows 
to developing countries amounted to US$84.4 billion, as against 
total net official development finance of US$49.3; but in 1983 the 
figures were, respectively, US$46.8 billion and US$54 billion and 
in 1987 they stood, respectively,, at US$12.2 billion and US$26.9 
billion, official development finance being more than double that 
of private flows, reflecting a complete reversal of the earlier 
pattern of resource flows to developing countries.
18. This new pattern was due to the loss of credit-worthiness by 
most developing countries whicji resulted from the debt crisis and 
the rising cost of finance. Private loans constituted the part of 
private flows that registered the biggest decline, despite a marked 
increase in involuntary lending, it went down from a level of 
US$64.5 billion in 1981 to US$0.1 billion in 1987, reflecting 
clearly the reluctance of private creditors to increase their 
exposure in developing countries. This trend accounted for the 
much heavier reliance of developing countries on official 
development finance rather than private finance from 1983 onwards. 
Official development finance accounted for 69 per cent of aggregate 
net flov/s to developing countries in 1987, increasing from a mere 
37 per cent in 1981, a pattern normally associated with low-income 
developing countries. Only one component of private flows, private 
grants, remained at more or less stable levels throughout the 
period 1981-1987, showing a slight increase in 1987 from its level 
of 1981.
19. The steady flow of private grants to developing countries 
reflects the increasing role played by institutions such as non­
governmental organizations in the provision of development finance 
to developing countries. Direct private investments decreased from 
US$17.5 billion in 1981 to US$9.0 billion in 1988, but seemed to 
have stabilized around US$9 billion for both 1987 and 1988. Most 
recent increases in this component were due to debt/equity swaps 
and secondary market transactions4.
20. Official development finance flows decreased from a high level 
during the period 1980-1988 US$54.0 billion in 1983 to an all-
time low of US$25.3 billion, or by 50 per cent over a six-year 
period. The non-concessional portion of official development 
finance flows, after registering a slight increase between 1980 and 
1983, declined to a negative US$0.1 billion in 1988 most probably 
reflecting the outflow of funds from developing countries to
4 World Bank debt tables 1989-1990. Vol. 1: Analysis and
Summary Tables, Page 10.
7
multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank and 
the IMF which became major providers of funds in the early 1980s, . 
when a vast majority of developing countries faced with debt- 
servicing problems entered into structural adjustment programmes ■ 
with them.
21. The official grants and the official concessional loans 
components of official development finance increased over the 
period 1980-1985 and then decreased steadily to reach US$25.4 
billion in 1988, compared to US$31.3 in 1985; this decrease was not 
as pronounced as that observed ih the other components of resource 
flows but it was nonetheless important, given that in the latter 
part of the 1980s the bulk of resource flows to developing 
countries was accounted for by official sources.
22. The overall contraction of resource flows to developing 
countries did not affect equally all the economies and regional 
groupings of developing countries. Those categorized as middle- 
income developing countries (MIC) with debt- servicing problems, 
whose debt had been contracted at market-related variable rates, 
were the hardest hit because of rising interest rates and reduced 
private flows. They registered net outward transfers which would 
have been even greater in the absence of the rescheduling and 
involuntary lending from which they benefited.
23. The low-income developing countries, the majority of whose 
borrowing and other external flows had been on concessional terms, 
were somewhat insulated from the net negative transfer phenomenon. 
Even then, aggregate net transfers to these countries declined 
substantially, whereas their weaker economies could hardly 
withstand such a reduction.
Terms and conditions of 
external resource flows
A. Finance from official sources
24. The terms of finance from official sources remained rather 
stable over the period 1980-1988 (see Table III). However, the 
grant element of these flows dropped from 21.1 per cent in 1980 to 
9.3 per cent in 1983, before steadily increasing to 24.6 per cent 
at the end of 1988,fstill lower than the 25 per cent grant element
V
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normally attached to official development assistance from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)5 of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)6.
Table III
AVERAGE TERH$ OF NEW COMMITMENTS TO 
MIDDLE-INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES




8.6 8.6 8.3 7.7 7.3 6.6 6.2
Maturity (years) 19.0 17.6 17.6 17.8 17.0 16.5 16.9 18.8
Grace period (years) 5.2 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.8 5.4
Grant element (X) 21.1 10.5 9.3 11.6 13.7 15.7 20.5 24.6
PRIVATE CREDITORS
Interest (X) 12.4 12.7 10.7 10.9 9.2 7.7 7.6 7.9
Maturity (years) 9.5 9.2 8.9 9.9 10.9 9.8 9.2 8.8
Grace period (years) 3.9 3.7 3.5 4.7 5.7 4.1 4.1 3.9
Grant element (X) -11.2 -11.3 -3.0 -4.5 4.0 10.4 9.8 8.3
Source: World Bank Debt Tables 1989-1990. Volune 1, Pg. 114.
25. After an increase in 1982 of 1.6 per cent, the average 
interest rate on these flows decreased steadily to 6.2 per cent at 
the end of 1988. The latter part of the 1980s having been a
-----------------------------------------------------  ;»ii
5 DAC member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America 
and the European Economic Community.
• OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, ; 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
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generally non-inflationary period, the real interest rates charged 
on this type of finance would have been very close to the nominal 
ones and rather high for what is mostly considered to be 
concessional finance.
26. The grace period on these types of loans oscillated over the 
period 1980-1988 - between 4.6 years and 5.4 on average - which is 
lower than the period, normally considered as adequate of 8 to 10 
years.
27. In addition to the usual terms of their finance, some official 
creditors sometimes tied their assistance to certain conditions, 
including the procurement of machinery and equipment of a 
particular origin and the recruitment of consultants and firms from 
specific donor countries. Table IV gives an indication of the 
extent of tied official development assistance from individual 
donor countries during the year 1987.
B. Finance from private sources
28. The average interest rate charged on borrowing from private 
sources decreased from 12.4 per cent in 1980 to 7.9 per cent in 
1988 (see Table III), but there was an increase in the average rate 
for 1988. Growing fears of inflation in the industrial world and 
the use of interest-rate policies to deal with inflationary 
pressures were largely responsible for this upward trend in average 
interest rates. The average grace period attached to this type of 
finance decreased from an all-time high for the period of 5.7 years 
in 1985 to an average of 3.9 years in 1988, the same grace period 
that prevailed in 1980. The maturity period also registered a 
steady decline from 1985 decreasing to an average of 8.8 years in 
1988.
29. The grant element was the only component in this type of 
finance to register marked improvement in the late 1980s. Compared 
to earlier years, however, it declined from 10.4 per cent in 1986 
to 8.3 per cent in 1988. The exchange rate also had an important 
bearing on resource flows, fluctuating widely since the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. Such fluctuation 
hardened or softened average terms of finance, depending on the 
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(1) i (2) (3) <<) 1 (5) 
1
(6) <7) (6) (9) (10) 1 
1
(ID (12) (13) (14)
Australia 32.4 1 27.5 0.7 3.0
1
34.7 20.7 23.5 19.3 . 1.3 55.9 44.0
Austria 1.8 1 0.5 0.2 0.9 - 72.6 27.1 23.9 1.7 1 - . 25.7 74.3
Belgium 25.0 { 3.3 3.4 41.1 - 32.6 19.1 25.6 16.8 0.2 50.6 32.6
Canada 27.6 1 8.8 # # 1 3.9 29.5 0.7 33.4 15.6 0.5 61.0 35.1
Denmark 32.6 ) 0.4 2.2 29.9 - 21.6 - 37.4 2.1 J. 6.3 . 70.0 23.7
Finland 9.9 i 3.7 - 6.2 49.1 14.2 34.3 6.7 1 - - 44.2 55.8
France 42.2 1 20.1 8.6 XI.0
i
I 3.5 3.5 33.6 23.0 13.4 1 7.3 3.9 55.6 33.6
Germany 42.2 1 3.8 18.7 17.1 1 - 33.0 13.5 15.2 9.6 57.4 33.0
Ireland 21.5 1 12.8 - •• • 25.7 24.4 44.7 3.1 1 5.0 - 66.2 28.8
Italy 9.5 1 7.0 1.2 1.2
1
61.8 13.7 18.7 0.6 1 9.3 7.5 28.2 62.4
Japan 46.9 { 17.6 - 31.5 ] 16.6 - 11.3 • 25.2 • 1 - 0.1 72.1 11.3
Netherlands 30.5 1 10.8 12.1 6.5 1 33.7 11.3 6.4 - 21.8 7.3 I 0.3 4.1 52.3 13.7
New Zealand 34.5 1 14.4 2.3 17.9
1 • 32.6 14.1 31.3
1
1.6 1 65.8 34.2
Norway 29.8 1 (1.7) - - 1 1.4 - 21.1 .. 44.6 3.1 1 •„ - 0.5 74.4 24.2
Sweden 41.6 1 2.6 - - 22.3 13.9 33.8 2.3 1 - 2.9 75.4 24.6
Switzerland 46.5 1 37.1 7.6 1.8 * 34.3 17.8 17.6 11.6 1 4.8 64.1 35.9
United Kingdom 13.1 1 6.3 0.1 .. t 0.1 - 42.3 23.7 24.9 0.8 1 18.7 2.1 38.0 43.1
Umtad States 26.3 1 26.3 • • 1 36.6
1
14. 4 16.3 13.5 19.1 1.7 1 
1
*■ - 45.4 18.0
Total DAC 33.4 1 14.6 4.7 •• 1 13.0
1
3.9 26.7 13.6 21.4 1.4 1
!
4.2 1.8
• Fully end freely available for essentially world-wide procurement.
1» Amounts not dlroetly financing Imports: budget and belence-of-peyments support, local cost financing and dabt relief
c Contributions available for procuromont from donor and substantial1y «11 dovaloping countrlos
d Mainly aid t1«d to procuromont 1n tho donor country, but also Includes amounts available for procuromont 1n several countries,
but not widely enough to qualify as "partially untied".
* Compliance with revised reporting Instructions remains to be verified.
Source: OECD 1989 Report, "Development Co-operation 1n the 1990s", Paris, 1989
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Resource flows to Caribbean countries/
30. Caribbean economies rely heavily on external resources for the 
financing of their economic growth. This heavy reliance on foreign 
savings is due to the low and sometimes negative savings ratios 
achieved by the countries of the region. This situation 
deteriorated substantially during the 1980s. In addition, most 
countries experienced balance-of-payments deficits which reflected 
further their increased dependency on external resource flows8. 
The following section of this paper deals with the flow of external 
capital to Caribbean countries from both official and private 
sources, as well as the resulting net transfers.
A. External capital flows from official sources 1980-1988
31. Flows from official sources of finance to Caribbean countries 
decreased from US$1,016.3 million in 1980 to an estimated US$426.4 
million for 1988, indicating an unmistakable trend towards an 
overall decrease in finance from these sources, despite a slight 
increase in 1981 and 1982. The multilateral loans component of 
these flows registered the biggest decrease in this category of 
finance, showing a net estimated outflow of US$19.9 million in 
1988. The bilateral loans component of official flows also 
decreased over the period, from US$544.9 million in 1980 to an 
estimated US$16.1 million in 1988. On the other hand, the grants 
component of these flows increased steadily over the period.
32. The overall decline in flows from official sources could be 
attributed partially to high service payments in the case of 
multilateral loans and the resurgence of financial constraints 
experienced by some of the bilateral donors in the case of 
bilateral loans. Table V gives the details of net external capital 
flows to Caribbean countries from multilateral, bilateral and 
private creditors.
1. Multilateral loans 1
33. The multilateral loans component of official flows registered 
the biggest decline over the period considered. It decreased 
steadily from 1983 onwards, to reach the estimated negative figure 
of US$19.9 million in 1988. In 1980 the World Bank provided a net 
US$104.5 million worth of loans to Caribbean countries, or 48.6
7 The countries covered are: Antigua and Barbuda, the
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.
8 Commonwealth Secretariat/Caribbean Community Secretariat, 





CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES - Net external capital flous, 1980-88 (USS «11IIon)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 p/ 1988 p/
OFFICIAL CREDITORS 1016.3 1347.3 1438.0 1050.7 948.8 864.0 495.1 445.8 426.4
MULTILATERAL LOANS 215.4 488.7 554.2 551.9 259.4 287.6 -1.6 3.2 -19.9
COB 35.6 51.8 30.3 23.9 11.0 16.3 18.5 18.1 20.5
EOF 1.8 3.3 3.0 2.1 0.5 1.6 0.6 1.4 -0.1
EIS 6.9 6.3 2.1 6.8 10.9 6.1 5,4 21.9 3.6
EEC 7.0 6.3 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5
IBRD/IDA 104.5 99.4 . 169.1 106.8 79.8 91.0 14.5 65.0 9.7
IDB 90.0 90.2 87.8 106.3 98.4 161.8 112.5 100.3 86.9
IFAD 0.6 0.3 2.1 2.1 3.2 5.7 4.0 8.3 -0.8
INF Trust Fund 8.7 13.4 -Ó.1 -0.6 -2.1 -3.1 -5.8 -5.2 -4.8
INF Credits -60.5 191.4 238.9 301.1 61.9 23.1 -149.3 -211.3 -131.1
INF SAF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 11.1 0.0
OPEC 20.8 26.3 19.1 2.8 -4.4 -4.2 -3.0 -6.4 -4.3
BILATERAL LOANS 544.9 566.3 603.7 319.8 404.2 200.9 138.7 35.8 16.1
Brazil 4.4 9.8 -0.5 10.8 -1.2 -1.7 -0.9 -2.0 -1.9
Canada of which: 25.3 9.1 10.0 1.0 29.4 22.2 32.0 -10.1 1.5
CIDA 11.8 11.2 10.5 10.5 17.8 1.3 0.0 -0.7 -1.0
EDC 4.8 -0.8 -2.6 -4.2 -1.2 -2.0 -2.2 3.8 6.1
China 0.0 9.7 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.3 2.4 -0.6 -0.4
France 3.6 4.1 3.2 1.1 2.0 7.6 11.3 11.4 11.0
Germany 15.9 8.1 4.8 10.6 4.1 2.4 19.8 40.4 5.7
Japan 5.1 9.5 6.7 4.9 19.6 28.9 35.8 7.5 18.2
Mexico -0.5 58.5 32,1 30.8 42.3 -13.5 9.5 13.2 -4.3
Netherlands 39.9 2.2 3.3 8.2 0.0 2.2 -1.7 0.0 0.0
Spain 22.0 18.2 57.5 22.9 16.0 3.3 1.7 2.7 0.0
Taiwan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.0
Trinidad & Tobago 12.2 82.0 3.4 2.9 1.2 8.7 -19.6 -27.5 -24.2
UK 11.0 16.2 19.2 25.5 3.6 6.7 4.9 10.0 3.3
USA of which: 164.8 174.6 316.0 172.9 268.9 101.9 37.8 -9.7 20.5
AID 17.5 51.3 170.3 91.7 115.0 38.9 38.3 14.5 13.1
CCC 40.2 34.6 44.9 31.6 93.1 -17.4 -12.9 -20.3 -23.3
EXINBANK 85.0 74.5 27.5 -18.5 16.8 -38.4 -51.5 -46.1 -14.6
Venezuela 141.4 166.4 123.8 28.5 18.2 23.5 7.2 -16.9 -19.3
Others 99.8 -2.1 24.2 -0.3 -3.5 4.5 -2.1 17.4 6.0
GRANTS 255.0 292.3 280.1 179.0 285.2 375.5 358.0 406.8 430.2
UNDP 23.5 32.8 28.5 30.3 27.2 24.2 25.5 23.5 n.a.
Other Huit. 31.5 34.5 26.3 15.5 23.3 29.3 32.7 33.2 n.a.
Canada 5.6 21.9 22.7 26.0 43.7 37.0 50.7 58.3 n.a.
France 0.5 6.8 3.2 5.7 4.4 4.8 7.0 10.4 n.a.
Germany S-1 9.2 17.5 13.3 12.4 11.6 14.3 16.5 n.a.Italy 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.8 2.7 4.4 17.1 8.1 n.a.
Japan 1.5 5.1 }•! 4.3 4.4 8.4 9.4 14.7 17.6 n.a.
Netherlands 128.1 99.9 '104.4 9.2 7.6 6.6 5.9 11.3 n.a.
UK 28.1 21.6 14.8 13.7 11.3 7.2 10.5 14.1 n.a.
per cent of the total net multilateral loans received by those 
countries in that year. Its contribution to net capital flows to 
Caribbean countries was, however, estimated to be only US$9.7 
million in 1988, a decrease of US$94.8 million compared to the 
1980 figure.
34. From 1981 to 1983 the IMF replaced the World Bank as the ; 
Caribbean countries' biggest provider of net multilateral loans 
with a contribution of US$204.8 million in 1981, US$238.8 million 
in 1982 and US$300.5 million in 1983, or 41.9 per cent, 43 per cent
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and 54.4 per cent, respectively, of total net multilateral loans. 
In 1987 and 1988 Caribbean countries made net payments to the IMF - 
of us$205.4 million and US$135.9 million, respectively. These 
outflows were counterparts to earlier inflows from the Fund and 
reflect the short-term nature of IMF credit; they were, however, 
concentrated in the few Caribbean countries9 which had entered into 
agreements with the Fund.
35. After the World Bank apd the IMF, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) was the multilateral institution making the 
highest net multilateral loans to Caribbean countries. From 1984 
onwards, when both the Bank's and the Fund's net disbursements were 
dwindling, IDB disbursements were on the rise, reaching an 
estimated US$86.9 million in 1988, compared with a negative 
US$135.6 million from the IMF and a positive but much reduced 
amount from the Bank of US$9.7 million. Net disbursements by the 
Caribbean Development Bank (C'DB) to Caribbean countries increased 
substantially from US$35.6 million in 1980 to US$51.8 million in 
1981 but decreased afterwards to reach an all-time low, for the 
period 1980-1988 of US$11 million in 1984. They then grew slowly 
to reach an estimated S$20.5 million in 1988, or less than half the 
amount disbursed in 1981. !
36. European Economic Community (EEC) institutions, such as the 
European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), as well ás the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), seem to have always been marginal contributors 
to finance in the Caribbean. Except for the net loans of US$21.9 
million in 1987 provided by EIB, the contribution of EEC 
institutions for the other years has been of little significance. 
The contribution of the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), after having been the fourth largest to Caribbean 
countries in 1980 and fifth in 1981 and 1982, subsequently declined 
substantially; OPEC became a net recipient of funds from Caribbean 
countries in the last five year^ of the period under consideration, 
largely due to the decline in oil prices.
37. Apart from IDB funds which were provided in a more or less 
stable flow of loans to Caribbean countries, financing from other 
multilateral banks fluctuated substantially. This was probably 
the reflection of a shift from their concessional to their non­
concessional portfolio which, in turn, might be due to the 
hardening terms of their capital market borrowings.
9 Dominica and Jamaica had an extended Fund Facility 
arrangement in 1981 and the Dominican Republic in 1983; Barbados 
and Haiti had standby arrangements with the Fund in 1982t Source: 
IMF Annual Reports 1981, 1982 and 1983.*
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2. Bilateral loans
38. Total bilateral loans provided to Caribbean countries declined 
substantially over the period 1980-1988, but remained positive 
throughout. The biggest single source over the period 1980-1985 
was the United States of America with a heavy concentration for the 
first two years on export credit financing which represented 51.5 
per cent of total United States bilateral loans in 1980 and 42.6 
per cent in 1981. From 1982 soft-term loans granted by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) represented the 
bulk of United States bilateral loan disbursements to Caribbean 
countries. The overall United States net disbursements to the 
Caribbean declined steadily from 1985 onwards, mainly due to 
negative flows from the United States Export/Import Bank (EXIMBANK) 
loans which started the same year.
39. In the first three years of the 1980s the Republic of 
Venezuela, a developing country, was the second biggest net 
provider of bilateral loans to the Caribbean after the United 
States. This situation changed sharply afterwards, with a large 
decrease of flows for subsequent years and reverse flows for both 
1988 and 1989. A second developing country, the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago, was a net provider of resources to Caribbean 
countries up to 1985 and it was the third biggest provider of 
bilateral loans to the region in 1981, after the United States of 
America and Venezuela.
40. A third developing country, the Republic of Mexico, was a net 
provider of resources to Caribbean countries throughout the period 
1980-1988 except for 1985 and 1988, when it was a net recipient of 
resources from the Caribbean region. The Republic of Brazil was 
another developing country whose flows became negative over the 
last years of the period under consideration. Venezuela, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Mexico are oil-producing countries whose net 
bilateral loan disbursements to Caribbean countries declined 
because of the fall in oil prices and their own restructuring and 
debt-servicing problems.
41. Two other developing>*countries, the People's Republic of China 
and the Republic of China (Taiwan), also contributed, albeit 
marginally, to bilateral loans to Caribbean countries during the 
period 1980-1988.
42. Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, 
Japan and Spain were the other major industrialized countries which 
provided bilateral loans to the Caribbean. Although decreasing 
substantially during both 1987 and 1988, the Canadian contribution 
to net external capital flows to the Caribbean during the period
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1980-1988 was the largest after those of Spain and Japan. Japan 
and the Federal Republic of Germany seemed to have joined the . 
traditional Caribbean partners in the provision of bilateral loans 
on a regular basis.
3. Grants
43. The amount of grants provided to Caribbean countries during 
the period 1980-1988 was the only component of resources from 
official creditors which has registered a marked increase. From 
US$255 million in 1980, it dropped to US$179 million in 1983 and 
then increased steadily to reach an estimated amount of US$430.2 
million in 1988. The United States of America was the single 
largest provider of grants to the Caribbean region during the 
period under consideration, providing 28.3 percent, 48.2 per cent, 
60.5 per cent, 45.5 per cent and 46.9 per cent of all grants to 
Caribbean countries for the years 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1987, 
respectively.
44. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, which was the largest provider 
of grants to the Caribbean region for the years 1980, 1981 and 
1982, became one of the industrialized countries with the lowest 
contributions to grants in the region from 1983. From that same 
year onwards, Canada was the third largest provider of grants to 
the Caribbean region after the United States and multilateral 
organisations, while Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany were 
still minor providers of grants to the region. However, their 
contributions seemed to be on the increase.
45. The United Kingdom's provision of grants seemed also to be on 
the increase, despite a sharp fall culminating in net grants of 
US$7.2 million in 1985; the increase was, however, modest and the 
1987 level is still far below that of 1980. Two industrialized 
countries, France and Italy, were still very much marginal 
contributors. i
46. The multilateral organisations provided a steady flow of 
grants to the Caribbean throughout the period; their contribution 
was over or close to 20 per cent of total grants to the Caribbean 
region for the years 1980 to 1983 and above 10 per cent from then 
onwards. This fall in the share represented by their participation 
was heavily compensated by the large amounts of grants disbursed 
by the United States of America over recent years, reflecting 
policies giving priority to bilateral financing over multilateral 
financing. These organisations were the second largest 
contributors of grants to the region throughout the period 1980- 
1986, after the Netherlands for the first three years and after the
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United States of America for the rest of the period. This pattern 
demonstrates clearly the stability and dependability of such 
finance in the region. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) was the largest contributor among the multilateral 
organisations.
47. Grants provided by privatè organisations which were non­
existent in 1980 grew increasingly thereafter. From US$3 million 
in 1981, they reached US$8 million in 1984 and then decreased to 
stand at an estimated US$5.0 million in 1988.
«
B. External capital flows from private sources
j
48. Flows from private sources to the Caribbean have fluctuated 
sharply over the years, reaching an estimated all-time low for the 
period of a net outflow of US$37.5 million in 1987. Suppliers' 
credits, which started the 1980s with a net outflow of funds from 
the Caribbean region, increased somewhat over the years, but turned 
negative in 1988. Loans from private banks and other private money 
lenders increased substantially from their 1980 level of US$107.1 
million for the three subsequent years, dropped sharply in 1984 and 
increased again to US$165.0 million, US$226.8 million and US$231 
million, respectively in 1985 1986 and 1988, the 1987 figure 
reflected a reverse flow from Caribbean countries of US$102.0 
million. The huge flows of resources from the banks and other 
private lenders in 1985, 1986 and 1988 were almost entirely devoted 
to paying interest on debt contracted earlier. This would be 
clearer in the section on net transfers to Caribbean countries 
which will take into account interest paid on accumulated debt.
Financial transfers to Caribbean countries10
i
49. Net financial transfers to Caribbean countries decreased 
substantially over the period under consideration, after a slight 
increase in 1981 and 1982 and there was a net outflow of US$207.7 
million in 1987. All the various components of resource flows in 
Table 6 have decreased over the years, except, of course, the 
grants.
50. On bilateral and multilateral loans net outflows were 
registered for the last three years. Multilateral loan creditors 
were net recipients of US$218.1 million in 1986, US$238.0 million 
in 1987 and US$266.2 million in 1988 from Caribbean countries. Out 
of the multilateral institutions receiving net transfers from 
Caribbean countries, the IMF was the largest, followed by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
accounting between them for an outflow of US$307.7 million in 1986,
10 Net financial transfers are defined as net disbursements 
minus interest payments on medium and long-term loans.
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Table VI
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES - Net transfers, 1980-88 (USS an)
1980 1981 1982 : 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 p/ 1988 p/
OFFICIAL CREDITORS 902.5 1150.3 1200.5 780.2 647.9 536.2 126.8 47.5 37.7
MULTILATERAL LOANS 175.5 404.5 430.3 407.7 78.2 106.4 -218.1 -238.0 -266.2
COB 32.7 46.6 24.0 16.9 3.2 6.0 8.2 6.5 7.3
ED F 1.1 3.3 3.6 2.1 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.2 -0.3
EIB 6.6 5.6 1.2 ¡J 6.0 10.0 4.3 3.2 19.6 -4.7
EEC 7.0 6.3 1.3 > 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.4
IBRD/IDA 79.2 70.2 132.3 58.9 26.7 32.0 -65.0 -23.4 -81.1
IDB 85.1 83.2 78.1 94.9 83.5 130.7 78.6 51.9 28.8
IFAD 0.6 0.3 2.1 2.1 3.1 5.4 3.3 7.3 -1.8
IMF Trust Fund 8.6 13.2 -0.3 -0.9 -1.9 -3.4 -6.1 -5.3 -4.6
IMF Credits -65.8 150.6 170.9 227.0 -39.0 -64.8 -237.6 -299.6 -204.5
IMF SAF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 11.3 -0.1
OPEC 20.4 25.2 17.1 0.1 -8.1 -5.6 -4.2 -7.4 -5.6
BILATERAL LOANS 472.0 453.5 490.1 193.5 284.5 54.3 -13.1 -121.3 -126.3
BrazII 3.4 7.4 -2.1 8.2 -2.7 -2.5 -1.3 -2.2 -2.0
Canada of which: 15.7 -1.1 0.3 -5.5 18.9 9.5 15.0 -24.9 -15.6
CIDA 10.3 10.1 9.5 9.5 16.9 0.3 -0.7 -1.4 -1.7
EDC 3.0 -3.2 -4.8 -5.5 -2.5 2.4 -3.5 2.9 3.6
China 0.0 9.7 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.2 2.4 -0.6 -0.4
France 3.6 4.1 3.1 1.0 2.0 7.1 9.9 10.4 8.2
Germany 15.7 7.1 4.0 9.8 3.3 1.6 18.1 39.1 3.1
Japan 5.1 8.9 6.1 3.6 18.7 26.6 31.2 1.3 9.9
Mexico -0.6 54.9 30.7 23.6 34.1 -16.4 -1.2 2.6 -8.0
Netherlands 38.2 0.9 1.8 7.4 -0.3 1.6 -3.7 -0.5 -0.6
Spain 21.8 14.0 54.0 16.7 11.8 3.0 1.7 2.7 0.0
Taiwan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -0.1
Trinidad & Tobago 7.9 77.1 -2.5 -2.5 -14.3 -0.3 -26.7 -30.7 -28.1
UK 2.3 8.5 12.2 19.2 0.2 1.8 2.0 5.3 -2.1
USA of which: 133.9 126.6 266.0 116.4 215.9 35.1 -14.1 -80.4 -44.5
AID 11.3 44.4 164.9 82.9 107.4 26.6 26.9 5.0 -0.1
CCC 35.1 20.7 29.1 19.7 85.3 -30.3 -23.3 -50.8 -40.9
EXIMBANK 70.7 51.4 3.1 -50.4 -13.2 -73.1 -77.3 -67.9 -30.2
Venezuela 127.2 146.6 100.5 3.6 3.7 -5.4 -19.2 -32.6 -39.5
Others 97.8 -11.2 16.0 -8.0 -10.4 -11.4 -27.7 -10.7 -6.6
GRANTS 255.0 292.3 280.1 179.0 285.2 375.5 358.0 406.8 430.2
UNDP 23.5 32.8 28.5 30.3 27.2 24.2 25.5 23.5 n.a.
Other Mult. 31.5 34.5 26.3 15.5 23.3 29.3 32.7 33.2 n.a.
Canada 5.6 21.9 22.7 i 26.0 43.7 37.0 50.7 58.3 n.a.
France 0.5 6.8 3.2 5.7 4.4 4.8 7.0 10.4 n.a.
Germany 9.1 9.2 17¿5 13.3 12.4 11.6 14.3 16.5 n.a.
Italy 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.8 2.7 4.4 17.1 8.1 n.a.
Japan 1.5 5.1 4.3 4.4 8.4 9.4 14.7 17.6 n.a.
Netherlands 128.1 99.9 104.4 9.2 7.6 6.6 5.9 11.3 n.a.
UK 28.1 21.6 14.8 13.7 11.3 7.2 10.5 14.1 n.a.
USA 16.0 50.9 47.2 50.7 137.6 227.2 162.9 190.9 n.a.
Other Bilat. 11.1 9.5 c10.1 9.4 6.6 13.8 16.7 19.3 n.a.
PRIVATE CREDITORS -102.8 -36.5 -58.2 -110.2 -183.5 -28.1 -20.9 -255.2 -22.4
Private grants 0.0 3.0 3.0 5.1 8.0 7.8 5.7 7.5 5.0
Suppliers -21.1 42.5 2.6 15.3 21.6 48.4 48.1 36.5 -45.5
Banks and others -81.7 -82.0 -63.8 -130.6 -213.1 -84.3 -74.7 -299.2 18.1
ALL CREDITORS 799.7 1113.8 1142.3 670.0 464.4 508.1 105.9 -207.7 15.3
US$377 million in 1987 and US$290.3 million in 1988. Displaying 
the same pattern as multilateral loans, bilateral loans also became 
negative, with a net outflow of US$13 million in 1986, US$121.3 
million in 1987 and US$126.3 million in 1988. The largest net 
recipient of outflows of bilateral loans from the Caribbean was the 
United States of America accounting for net receipts of US$80.4 
million in 1987 and US$44.5 million in 1988.
51. Banks and other private institutions were net recipients of 
funds from Caribbean countries throughout the 1980s, receiving net 
transfers of US$130.6 million in 1983, US$213 million in 1984 and 
US$299.2 million in 1987. A slight change to this massive outflow 




Interest payments 1980-1988 
(US$ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Net transfers on mlateral loans 175.5 404.5 430.3 407.7 78.2 106.4 -218.1 -238.0 -266.2
Net disburs of mlateral loans 215.4 486.7 554.2 551.9 259.4 287.6 -1.6 3.2 -19.9
Interest payments 39.9 82.2 123.9 144.2 181.2 181.2 216.5 234.8 246.3
Net transfers on bilat. loans 472.0 453.5 490.7 193.5 284.5 54.3 -13.1 -121.3 -126.3
Net disburs of bilat. loans 544.9 566.3 603.7 319.8 404.2 200.9 138.7 35.8 16.1
Interest payments 72.9 112.8 113.6 126.3 119.7 146.6 151.8 157.1 142.4
Net transfers on
suppliers' credits -21.1 12.5 2.6 15.3 21.6 48.4 48.1 36.5 -45.5
Net disburs on surpliers* cred -10.1 49.5 13.2 26.6 33.8 66.9 67.1 57.0 -27.9
Interest payments 11.0 7.0 10.6 11.3 12.2 18.5 19.0 20.5 17.6
Net transfers banks/others -81.7 -82.0 -63.8 -130.6 -213.1 -84.3 -74.7 -299.2 18.1
Net disburs by banks and
other private creditors 107.1 129.7 155.4 126.6 13.4 165.0 226.8 -102.0 231.0
Interest payments 188.8 211.7 219.2 257.2 226.5 249.3 301.5 197.2 212.9
Total interest paid 312.6. 413.7 467.3 539.0 539.6 595.6 688.8 609.6 619.2
Source: Derived from Tables V and VI.
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52. Table VII shows the magnitude of interest payments made by 
Caribbean countries during the 1980s. From US$312.6 million paid 
out in 1980, these payments increased steadily to an all-time high 
for. the period of US$688.8 million in 1986, then dropped to 
US$619.2 million in 1988, an amount almost double that paid in
1980.
53. Interest payments to banks and other private institutions 
constituted the largest part >òf total interest payments by 
Caribbean countries for most of ;the period under consideration, 
representing 60 per cent of such payments in 1980, 51 per cent in
1981, 47 per cent in 1982, 48 per cent in 1983 and 44 per cent in 
1986. In 1987 and 1988, interest payments to these institutions 
were overtaken by those paid to multilateral organisations which 
represented 38 per cent and 40 per cent for the two respective 
years, as against 32 and 34 per cent for private institutions. The 
increasingly important share of interest payments made to 
multilateral institutions was a testimony of the erosion of the 
credit-worthiness of some of these countries and the resulting 
reliance on loans from multilateral institutions, such as the IMF 
and the World Bank.
54. The magnitude of interest payments in relation to total 
external flows was such, that its impact on these flows became 
increasingly important and since their payments seem to have 
assumed priority over other uses of external financing, they were 
largely responsible for the net outflow of loan-related resources 
from Caribbean countries over recent years. The flows from banks 
and other private institutions which were largely positive in the 
context of net external capital flows in fact reflected net 
negative transfers for each year of the period 1980-1987, 
indicating that most of the lending taking place during that period 
was of the involuntary type.
i
Foreign direct investment in Caribbean countries
55. In general, foreign direct investments are considered superior 
to other types of external financing in so far as they do not 
constitute debt-creating flows and provide developing countries 
with a unique package of ^financial transfers, technology and 
management. One major danger of such investments which has been 
expressed time and again by some developing countries is the 
possible abuse related to ownership by foreign investors. On the 
other hand, foreign investors run the risk of expropriation, or 
loss of investment without proper compensation. With proper 
protection from both domination and expropriation this type of 
resource flows could be beneficial to both the foreign investors 
and the recipient countries.
56. Such investments are determined mainly by the economic 
prospects of the receiving countries, the profitability of the 
investments and the regulations governing them. The economic 
policies of the receiving countries, as well as their 
infrastructural and institutional arrangements, also represent 
factors which determine the flow pf foreign direct investments to 
them. Traditionally, however, foreign direct investment has always 
been heavily concentrated in countries with large domestic markets 
and in those which were rich in natural resources or which provided 
a sound base for export-oriented production.
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Table VIII
Direct investment - Caribbean countries (Million US$)
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Bahamas 4 34 3 -6 -5 -30 -13Barbados 1 7 4 2 -2 -5 5Belize • • • • . • • . # -4 4 1Jamaica Trinidad & 28 -12 -16 -19 12 -9 • •Tobago 185 258 204 114 110 -7 -22Antigua 20 22 23 5 9 10 13Dominica — — ■ — 2 3 6 —
Grenada - - 2 3 3 5 7St. Lucia 31 38 27 10 12 17 « •St. Vincent 1 1 2 2 1 3 3
Guyana 1 -2 4 5 5 2 -Dorn. Rep 1/ 2/ - -1 48 66 36 50Haiti 1/ 2/ — 127 106 5 11 104Neth. Ant. 1/ 2/ 34 2 -155 -97 2 -272 -1
Suriname 1/2/ 10 35 2 3 4 3 -8
TOTAL 315 383 226 178 221 -226 139
Source: Mobilizing capital for development: Therole of private flows. A report by the Commonwealth Secretariat, August 1988
ï
1/ Data for lÇãO-Ql supplied IMF International Financial Statistics 1987 Yearbook
2/ Data for 1982-86 supplied IMF International Financial Statistics, December 1989
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57. In the countries covered in Table VIII on direct investment 
there was a deceleration of such inflows similar to that . 
experienced by developing countries around the world due to 
changing perceptions of their economic growth prospects from US$315 
million in 1980 to US$178 million in 1983. Most of that decrease 
resulted from a heavy outflow of investments from the Netherlands 
Antilles and an outflow of lesser importance from Jamaica. 
Trinidad and Tobago was the largest recipient in the Caribbean of 
foreign direct investment for $he period 1980-1984; its receipt 
of such investments became negative, however, for both 1985 and 
1986. An outflow of US$272 million in direct investment from the 
Netherlands Antilles in 1985 resulted in a net outflow of US$226 
million from the Caribbean countries covered in the table.
Official Development Assistance” to CDCC member countries
58. Table IX on Official Development Assistance (ODA) indicates 
a more or less stable level of ODA flows to Caribbean countries 
over the period 1985-1988. It went down from US$1,610 million in 
1985 to US$1,457 million in 1986 and then went up to US$1,669 
million in 1987, declining again to US$1,590 million in 1988. More 
than half of the total ODA received by Caribbean countries for each 
year went to Cuba and 98 per cent of Cuba's share was provided by 
the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Other major ODA 
recipients in the Caribbean were Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, followed by the Netherlands Antilles, Guyana, Belize and 
Suriname.
59. The remarkable stability of this form of finance reflects the 
fact that it is largely determined by the donor country's budgeting 
process and its relations with the recipient country. Therefore, 
ODA maintenance or increase depends almost entirely on the donor 
country's own economic growth prospects and its policies. For six 
of the OECD12 countries, namely United States of America, Japan, 
Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy, real GNP is expected to 
grow by an average of 2.9 per cent for both 1990 and 1991, an 
indication of good growth prospects for ODA flows to developing 
countries. It is widely believed, however, that the flow of such 
resources to developing countries, including the Caribbean, will 
decrease in light of the assistance already pledged to Eastern 
European countries. * ■
11 Official Development Assistance is defined by the OECD as 
a transaction that conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent.
12 OECD forecast quoted in "The Economist", 23 December 1989.
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Table IX
Total net ODA from DAC countries, 
multilateral organizations, the USSR, Eastern Europe* and Arab countries to Caribbean countries (US$ million)
3
Country 1985 1986 1987 1988 TOTAL
Antigua and Barbuda 3 5 6 8 22Aruba 12 40 21 19 92Bahamas 1 6 1 4 12Barbados ! 7 4 6 3 20Belize 22 24 24 23 93Cuba 853 740 876 873 3342Dominica 17 11 14 19 61Dominican Republic . 207 93 130 118 548Grenada ' 35 24 20 23 102Guyana 27 31 29 27 114Haiti 153 175 218 147 693Jamaica 169 178 168 193 708Montserrat 2 4 3 6 15Netherlands Antilles 65 58 64 53 240St Kitts-Nevis 4 6 7 14 31St Lucia 7 12 11 14 44St Vincent and Gr. 6 12 13 15 46Suriname 11 14 22 21 68Trinidad and Tobago 7 19 34 8 68Virgin Islands 2 1 2 2 7
TOTAL 1610 1457 1669 1590 6326
* ODA from the USSR and Eastern Europe relate only to Cuba
Source: 1989 Report OECD Paris 1989Development Co-operation in the 1990s
The contribution of external resource flows 
to national development
60. Since resource constraints have prevented the undertaking of 
a study on the actual contribution of external resources to 
Caribbean development, the following review of some of the 
literature on the subject aims at giving an idea of some of the 
possible effects of external finance on economic growth.
61. It is generally believed that the rate of growth of an economy 
increases with the1 rise of the ratio of investment to national 
income and that an increase in the flow of external resources 
increases the investment ratio in the country concerned and 
therefore its growth rate. In order to achieve a given rate of
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growth,13 it is possible, under certain circumstances, to determine 
the rate of capital accumulation required to achieve such a growth 
target.
62. The difference between the rate of capital accumulation 
necessary for the targeted rate of growth and the proportion of 
national income saved and invested constitutes the saving gap or 
the volume of foreign resources required to achieve the target set. 
It is assumed here that the floy of foreign resources acts as a 
supplement to local savings and? would lead to a higher rate of 
accumulation of capital, an increase in the levels of income and 
an increase in the proportion of those incomes which would be 
saved, the overall result being an increase in the economy's 
capacity for growth.
63. This theory also assumes that all the local savings remain in 
their home countries in search of investment opportunities in the 
local economies14 and that they are used, together with the inflow 
of foreign resources to finance productive investments. The 
general conclusions of studies based on the above relationships 
indicate that external resource flows had a positive effect on the 
economic growth of developing countries1*.
64. These conclusions were later challenged when other studies16 
found out that external resources, especially foreign aid, not only 
did not contribute to the rate of economic growth of developing 
countries, but might actually have reduced such rate of growth. 
According to these studies, external resources actually reduced 
domestic savings and acted as a substitute for them. This 
relationship arose as a result of governments reducing their 
revenue-seeking activities and increasing their expenditure on
13 The rate of growth is determined in this case using the 
Harod-Domar growth equation which states that the rate of growth 
of output is equal to the savirigs rate divided by the incremental- 
capital output ratio. The model assumes a constant capital/output 
ratio and a marginal propensity ’to save higher than the average 
propensity to save and a stable propensity to import.
14 The fact that capital flight has received increasing 
attention over recent years, especially since the debt crisis 
demonstrates clearly that there are substantial resources leaving 
developing countries for developed countries.
15 H.B. Chenerey and A.M. Stout "Foreign Assistance and 
Economic Development", American Economic Journal. Vol. 56 (1966), 
pp. 679-733.
16 K. Griffin. "Foreign capital domestic savings and economic 
development". Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. Vol 
32, (1970), pp. 99-112.
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public consumption and private entrepreneurs and households 
reducing their savings because of the availability of inflows of 
external finance.
65. Moreover, the latter studies contended that most of the inflow 
of foreign resources tended to supplement consumption and only a 
small part went towards increasihg the rate of investment in the 
recipient countries and that foreign resources decreased the 
efficiency of investment in those countries. Tied aid was singled 
out as one of the main factors contributing to the decreased 
efficiency of investment in the countries considered.
66. Further studies17 10 undertaken on the relationships between 
external resource flows and economic growth have concluded that 
although the inflows of external resources had an effect on domestic savings, they did not reduce them or acted as a substitute 
for them; the observed decline in savings with an increase in 
external resources was due to other factors1* which might have led 
to the inflow of resources in the first place. These studies found 
no evidence of the lower efficiency of investments associated with 
foreign aid financing mentioned in earlier studies, the earlier 
relationships observed having been due to factors other than the 
inflow of external resources.
67. Considering the above brief review of some of the studies done 
on the contribution of external resource flows to economic growth of developing countries, it is clear that the effects of such flows 
on economic growth are not the same for all countries and that such 
effects could be either positive or negative, depending on the 
volume of the resources, the terms of such resources, the motives 
of the donors, the use made of the resources and the economic 
policies of the recipient countries. The contribution of other 
factors, such as the level of technology and the level of training 
of the labour force, impact on the rate of economic growth as much 
as the rate of investment and play an important role in the 
economic development of developing countries.
68. All the studies reviewed agree that developing countries undoubtedly face a number of¿constraints that restrict the rate of 
their economic growth. These constraints concern mainly the
17 Gustav F. Papanek . The effects of aid and other resource 
transfers on savings and growth in less developed countries., 
EgpnaffllP. -jQUEJial, September 1972.
10 Paul Bowles. "Foreign aid and domestic savings in less 
developed countries: Some tests for causality1*. World
Development. Vol 15, No. 6, (1987), pp. 789-796.
These factors include ai deterioration in the terms of trade, especially in countries heavily dependent on exports.
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insufficiency of capital compared to investment needs, the 
unavailability in sufficient numbers of a highly qualified and 
productive labour force and the insufficiency of foreign exchange 
to import essential machinery and equipment, usually not 
mánufactured locally.
69. The existence of these constraints limits the potential growth 
of the majority of developing countries and an inflow of external 
resources could greatly alleviatè these constraints and accelerate 
the economic growth of those countries. One study, however, 
cautions that removal of these constraints and increase in the rate 
of economic growth do not necessarily follow an increase in 
external resource flows and that the negotiation and management of 
such flows are of paramount importance if any benefits are to be 
derived from external resource flows.
Conclusions and recommendations
70. The flows of net external capital resources to Caribbean 
countries decreased substantially during the 1980s, with some 
countries experiencing greater declines than others. The major 
feature of these flows is that they were largely dominated by loans 
from both private and official sources. Together these loans 
accounted for 81, 83 and 85 per cent of net external capital flows 
to the Caribbean for the years 1981, 1982 and 1983 respectively. 
Such shares declined for the years 1984, 1985 and 1986 to 72, 66 
and 55 per cent respectively, of net total flows.
71. This heavy dependency on external loans makes the countries 
of the Caribbean particularly vulnerable to crises such as the 
crisis of confidence which exists nowadays, characterized by a 
decline in private and official loans, a stagnation of grants and 
high amortization and interest payments. That crisis is largely 
responsible for the overall decline of resource flows to the 
Caribbean region.
72. Within the loans component of net external capital flows to 
Caribbean countries, there was a major shift away from official 
loans to private loans during the period 1980-1988, but most of
those private loans were used to make debt-service payments, as
shown by the steady decrease in net transfers to the region for 
the period 1983-1988, despite an increase in net private loans.
73. The grants element of external resource flows accounted for 
99.7 per cent of net external capital flows to the Caribbean in
1987 and 68 per cent in 1988. However, this was not a reflection
of any substantial increase in such financing, but rather the
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decrease in the loans components of resource flows. The end result 
for Caribbean countries of this overall decline in external 
resource flows is further constraints on investment, output and 
economic growth.
74. The decline in resources for domestic investment brings into 
the forefront of economic policies the issue of mobilization of 
local resources through the promotion of savings, the creation of 
efficient capital markets and the formulation of policies conducive 
to the efficient allocation of local as well as foreign resources. 
This issue of greater reliance on domestic resources has attracted 
the attention of developing countries' policy-makers for some time, 
but it assumes a special importance today in the light of dwindling 
external resources and greater demand for development finance 
resulting from the recent economic reforms in Eastern Europe and 
deeper structural economic problems in some developing countries.
75. A new approach to development financing is therefore required. 
Such an approach should put more emphasis on the mobilization of 
local resources and use external financing as a genuinely 
supplementary source of finance. This approach would help, in the 
long run, to ensure the steady and stable financing of development 
even in times of dwindling external finance and increasing debt- 
servicing payments. In conjunction with efforts to increase 
reliance on domestic resources for development, Caribbean countries 
should intensify their efforts to mobilize external resources 
through sound economic policies, in particular on exchange rates, 
interest rates and taxation.
76. In order to ensure in later years that the funds borrowed will 
be repaid without undue constraints on economic growth, a clearly 
defined system of public investment project planning and 
implementation with the necessary institutional capability and 
political commitment should be put into place, or strengthened 
where it already exists, in order to ensure that resources, both 
domestic and foreign, are allocated in the most efficient manner 
and to the most productive uses in the economy. Such a system will 
require trained personnel in central as well as local institutions 
and a properly defined ¿methodology for project appraisal, 
budgeting, implementation and evaluation, to ensure that the best 
use is made of the limited resources available.
77. In the case of borrowed resources, especially those borrowed 
on market terms, a clearly articulated debt strategy which would 
include proper evaluation of the extremely volatile exchange and 
interest rates inherent in such borrowing should be adopted. An 
objective and thorough assessment of a country's capacity to 
generate the foreign exchange necessary to service its loans and 
an efficient debt-monitoring, system should form an integral part, 
of such a strategy.
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78. The important role that non-debt-creating flows, such as 
foreign direct investment, could play in the economic development 
of Caribbean countries should be fully realized and a structure and 
clear regulations should be established to ensure that the 
countries derive maximum benefits from such ventures.
79. Concessional finance which comprises concessional loans and 
grants ought also to receive the attention it deserves, especially 
in the less developed economies of the Caribbean and it is mainly 
this type of finance which should serve to finance the basic 
economic infrastructure in the countries. In this regard, the 
multilateral development institutions such as the regional banks, 
the World Bank and the United Nations agencies should intensify 
their efforts to promote the flow of such resources to the 
Caribbean.
80. Competition for the limited resources available worldwide is 
likely to intensify, at least in the near future, mainly because 
of the shortage of savings in relation to investment needs in the 
world and the lack of progress so far in correcting the major 
imbalances that have existed for some time now between the deficit 
countries and the surplus countries. The existence of those 
imbalances and recent economic and political developments are 
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